Elon is right. But you don't have to wait 20 years.
Editor's Note: Robert Kiyosaki, author of Rich Dad Poor Dad, the #1 personal finance book of all time with over 40 million copies sold, has spent decades teaching everyday Americans how the wealthy actually build income. He called the 2008 housing crash before it happened, warned investors to buy gold and silver well before their historic runs, and has been pounding the table on cash-flowing assets for over 30 years. Today, he'll show you an income play funded entirely by America's oil and gas infrastructure. One that's already paying some investors $25,000 a month and is the closest thing to universal basic income that may ever exist. Click here to see the details or read more below.
Elon Musk has been saying the same thing for almost a decade:
"Universal basic income is coming." It's not a question of if — it's when.
And he's right.
AI is already displacing millions of jobs. One report says 40% of all jobs could be automated within the next decade.
When that happens, the government will have no choice but to pay people. The money will come from the companies profiting from AI — through robot taxes, automation fees, or it could even come from a sovereign wealth fund like Alaska has with oil.
That's how Universal Income will get funded. That's how it will become real.
But here's the problem: Washington moves at a snail's pace. This could take 20 years.
So while Musk tweets and Congress holds hearings, what are you supposed to do? Wait?
I don't think so.
The way I see it, universal income already exists.
It's not funded by robots or AI. It's funded by America's oil and gas infrastructure — and it pays 10% a year, 42 times a year, to everyone who holds units.
I call it the Patriot Income Plan. It's made up of 14 partnerships — and it's already paying out.
In 2020, it paid out $28.8 billion. This year, it's expected to pay out $53 billion.
Think of it as your own personal sovereign wealth fund. Funded by American energy. Paying you like clockwork.
One investor collects $4,800 a month. Another pulls in over $25,000.
Elon is right. UBI is coming. But you don't have to wait.
Enrollment is easy.
Sincerely,
Robert Kiyosaki
Editor, The Kiyosaki Letter
Friday, September 4, 2026
Two Mines and a Shrinking Tin Buffer
The nickel playbook doesn't fit every metal.
Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in 2020. Foreign companies poured over $30 billion into domestic smelters and battery plants. Nickel's added value jumped from $1.4 billion to $34.8 billion in three years. By 2024, Indonesia produced 62% of the world's nickel.
The government calls this "downstreaming." Ban the raw export. Force processing to happen at home. Capture the value. It worked for nickel because demand existed on Indonesian soil. Stainless steel mills and battery factories could absorb what stayed.
Now the same government is turning the same strategy toward tin. On February 13, Energy Minister Bahlil Lahadalia said Indonesia is studying a tin export ban. Same minister. Same language. Same framework. But the target is a very different metal.
The Big Idea
Indonesia's nickel export ban worked because domestic industry could absorb the supply. Tin has no such industry. Indonesia consumes just 5% of the refined tin it produces. The other 95% ships out. Applying the same template to a structurally different commodity does not create a closed loop. It removes supply from a global market already in deficit.
It has nothing to do with AI, tech, or precious metals. Most investors have never heard of it.
But every time the Fed has made a major move, this ticker has moved with it… and the profits have been extraordinary.
117% in under a month. 89% in seventeen days. 35% in two days.
Now Trump is triggering the biggest Fed shift in nearly 20 years.
The Playbook and the Mismatch
The nickel ban succeeded for one mechanical reason. Indonesia had something to do with the nickel that stayed home. Foreign capital built smelters. Domestic factories bought the output. The loop closed.
Tin is different. Indonesia already exports high-purity refined tin, not raw ore. The processing step the government wants to force has already happened. The end market for that tin is solder. Chinese and East Asian electronics factories consume it. No comparable demand exists inside Indonesia.
The industry knows this. Indonesian tin groups have asked for a gradual phase-in. They need time to build domestic processing plants. Banks have refused to fund tin downstreaming projects. They see no viable return. The absorption capacity does not exist. No one is rushing to build it.
Observation: Indonesia consumes 5% of its refined tin output. The other 95% goes directly to export markets.
Interpretation: A full export ban would trap refined tin inside the country. No factories exist to use it. Buyers outside Indonesia would lose a major source with no short-term substitute.
The Squeeze Already Underway
The export ban is still being studied. But two other forces are already pulling tin out of the market.
The first is Indonesia's crackdown on illegal mining. President Prabowo Subianto shut down 1,000 illegal mines on the Bangka Belitung Islands between 2025 and mid-2026. The Jakarta Globe reported that 80% of the region's tin had been smuggled abroad.
PT Timah is the state-owned producer. Its ore output fell 32% in the first half of 2025. Illegal miners had undercut its operations for years. The crackdown restored order. It also removed a large volume of unregulated supply.
The second force is Myanmar. The Man Maw mine is a major source of tin concentrate for Chinese smelters. It suspended operations in August 2023. In 2024, China's raw tin imports from Myanmar fell from 54,900 tonnes in the first half to 21,500 in the second half. A slow restart began in early 2026, but Man Maw sits in Shan State. Ethnic militias and the military government have fought over the region for years. Renewed fighting has raised fresh doubts. The mine is not back to full capacity.
Observation: Indonesia shut 1,000 illegal mines. Myanmar's largest tin mine has run at reduced capacity since August 2023.
|Interpretation: Two of the world's top tin-producing regions are delivering less metal as of mid-2026. No export ban has taken effect yet.
The Deficit and the Price Signal
These supply pressures are hitting a market with no slack.
CRU, a commodity research firm, put first-half 2026 tin consumption at 179,256 tonnes. Production reached only 173,536 tonnes. That gap extends a deficit running since 2024. Solder accounts for more than half of all tin demand. Every AI server and circuit board needs it. That demand is not softening.
The physical buffer is draining. London Metal Exchange (LME) warehouse stocks fell to 6,000 tonnes in July 2026. That is down 30% in 30 days. A thin cushion for a global market.
The price reflects the structure. LME tin futures reached $56,695 per tonne in August 2026. That is more than 55% above August 2025 levels. The market is not waiting for a ban. It is pricing the forces already in motion.
Observation: Global tin consumption exceeded production by roughly 5,700 tonnes in the first half of 2026. LME warehouse stocks fell 30% in one month.
Interpretation: The market has no slack. Any further supply removal hits a system already stretched thin.
Quick Hits
The nickel export ban brought value-added exports to $34.8 billion by 2024, up from $1.4 billion.
Energy Minister Lahadalia confirmed on February 13 that a tin export ban is under study.
Indonesia consumes only 5% of its refined tin output.
Banks have refused to fund domestic tin processing projects.
Indonesia shut 1,000 illegal mines on Bangka Belitung between 2025 and mid-2026.
Myanmar's Man Maw mine has run below capacity since August 2023.
LME warehouse stocks fell 30% in 30 days to 6,000 tonnes in July 2026.
What the Tin Supply Chain Looks Like from Here
Three forces are pressing on tin supply at the same time. Indonesia's illegal-mine crackdown is removing unregulated metal. Myanmar's restart remains fragile. And the threat of an export ban hangs over a market already in deficit.
The nickel playbook worked because the conditions were right. Domestic demand existed. Foreign capital arrived. The ban created pressure the system could absorb. None of those conditions exist for tin today.
The signal to watch is not the ban itself. It is whether domestic absorption capacity appears. Track three things in the coming weeks. First, announcements of new tin processing facilities in Indonesia. Second, the pace of Man Maw's restart. Third, LME warehouse stock levels. Until domestic demand catches up with supply, the nickel template does not fit tin.
The Map So Far
Indonesia is applying its nickel playbook to a commodity where the conditions are inverted. The tin market is in deficit. Warehouse stocks are draining, and two major supply sources are delivering less.

Until next time,
The Navigator


